MON 810 is being used as animal feed in the EU. It was authorised for the first time in 1998 under Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).
2 In the period of 2001-2003 the EU legislative framework for GMOs was overhauled, and as a result more stringent regulations concerning the deliberate release and the placing on the market of GMOs were adopted.
3 Directive 90/220 was replaced by Directive 2001/18. 4 The latter regulates two types of deliberate release of GMOs into the environment, namely pre-commercial field trials 5 and the commercial cultivation of GM crops and plants. 6 In addition, Regulation 1829/2003 on genetically modified food and feed was enacted. This act regulates the circulation on the internal market of genetically modified food and feed products. It should be noted that the procedures for both prior-authorisation of GMOs and the adoption of post-market restrictions differ depending on the choice of the respective legal regime (ie of the Directive or of the Regulation). The Directive follows a de-centralised approach to both the process of market authorisation for GMOs and the adoption of post-market safeguard measures. Article 23 of the Directive gives Member States the right to provisionally restrict the cultivation of a GMO in order to react to potential risks emerging after that product has been authorised. The condition for the adoption of a safeguard measure is that the Member State in question "has detailed grounds for considering that a GMO (…) constitutes a risk to human health or the environment" as a result of new or additional information made available after the original authorisation.
Under Regulation 1829/2003 the procedures for both the authorisation of genetically modified food and feed and post-market restrictions are carried out at EU level. Article 34 of the Regulation provides for the possibility of adopting so-called emergency measures "where it is evident that products authorised by (…) this Regulation are likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal health or the environment." As regards the procedures for the adoption of emergency measures Article 34 refers to provisions concerning food and feed safety emergencies laid down in Regulation 178/2001 on the general principles and requirements of food law.
9 Under these emergency procedures of Regulation 178/2001 the Commission, in principle, has the prerogative of enacting post-market restrictive measures aiming at managing occurring food crises.
In 2008 
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In responding to this question the Court first interpreted the wording of Article 34 of the Regulation. In a concise manner and without much explanation it stated that "the expressions 'likely' and 'serious risk' must be understood as referring to a significant risk which clearly jeopardises human health, animal health or the environment. That risk must be established on the basis of new evidence based on reliable scientific data." 19 This textual reading was then backed up by a reference to the traditional formula developed in previous case law that protective measures (under Article 34 in that case) cannot validly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to the risk, founded on mere assumptions which have not yet been scientifically verified; and that such measures may be adopted only if they are based on a risk assessment which is as complete as possible in the particular circumstances of an individual case, which indicate the necessity of the measure. In addition, the Court also took the opportunity to elucidate the institutional aspects related to the regulatory scheme established by Regulation 1829/2003. Referring to its objective of avoiding artificial disparities in the treatment of a serious risk, the Court maintained the role of the Commission as the main risk manager in the post-authorisation phase. The Court did that by stating that "the assessment and management of a serious and evident risk ultimately come under the sole responsibility of the Commission and the Council, subject to review by the European Union Courts."
21 As long as no decisions regarding an authorised product have been adopted at EU level, the Member States retain the competence to adopt protective measures under the combined provisions of Articles 34 Regulation 1829/2003 and Article 54 Regulation 178/2002, which then are subject to judicial control by the national courts whilst the uniformity of EU law may be ensured by the Court under the preliminary ruling procedure.
22 However, as soon as the Commission adopts a decision at EU level following comitology, the factual and legal assessments relating to that case and contained in such a decision are binding on all Member States.
23 After that clarification of the institutional aspects, the Court returned to its answer to the third question, which was that "with a view to the adoption of emergency measures, Article 34 of Regulation No 1829/2003 requires the Member States to establish, in addition to urgency, the existence of a situation which is likely to constitute a clear and serious risk to human health, animal health or the environment."
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III. Comment
Monsanto and others is the last in a series of judgments by the European Courts, in which the legality of national derogations from the EU legal framework on genetically modified organisms (GMOs) was in question.
25 Most of these cases concerned the legal interpretation of derogation-clauses laid down in both EU primary and secondary law 26 , and thus the question under which substantive conditions Member States may legitimately restrict GMOs already authorised by the EU on their territory. What is interesting about the present case, however, is that for the first time the question of the applicable legal basis for a national ban of GMO seeds was raised. The main legal problem addressed by the European Court, therefore, was to ascertain which legal regime (that of Directive 2001/18 or that of Regulation 1829/2003) should govern the adoption of national post-authorisation restrictions of "existing products". Although this case seems to concern a merely transitional problem, ie that of GM products authorised under the framework of the Directive while notified and pending authorisation under the Regulation, it is also significant with regard to more general issues of precautionary multi-level governance of GMOs in the EU, as will be shown below.
1. The choice of the applicable legal regime for "existing products"
According to the Advocate General (AG) Mengozzi the main legal question raised in this case pertaining to the correct legal basis for provisional national restrictions of the cultivation of "existing" GM products presented the Court with a "relatively limited" legal problem. 27 The Court seems to share this view, which is reflected in the little effort that it conducted in making the legal argument sustaining Article 34 and thereby also the legal regime of Regulation 1829/2003 as the applicable legal framework. The first question, which concerned this issue, was dealt with within four short paragraphs mainly restating the wording of the relevant provisions of Regulation 1829/2003 (ie Articles 20 (5) and 17 (5)). Beyond this textual interpretation, the Court did not find it necessary to engage with any further methods of legal interpretation pertaining to legislative purpose of the legal instruments in question, the relationship between both legal regimes ( (1) of the Regulation was the actual condition allowing MON810 to legally be placed on the market (in the transitional period of the pending application for authorisation renewal), it had the de-facto effect of an authorisation. The designation of this act as authorisation or notification was considered to be a formality.
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Article 12 of Directive 2001/18 could arguably be interpreted in stricter terms than those chosen by the AG. In the EU (and in other legal orders) the prior-authorisation and the notification schemes constitute two different regulatory approaches with considerable legal and practical differences for both the regulatory authorities and the regulatées.
30 One of the most important differences is that under the prior-authorisation scheme a product may not be placed on the market before the process of risk evaluation has been completed by the authorities. It could therefore be argued that the lex specialis effect of Regulation 1829/2003 would unfold only once the process of authorisation including a complete risk evaluation under this Regulation has been completed. This shows that when focusing on Article 12 of the Directive as the relevant provision to be interpreted, this case could, in principle, be argued in favour of maintaining the applicability of Article 23 of the Directive until the renewal of authorisation under the Regulation.
The Court decided not to engage with these arguments, and instead chose a textual interpretation of Regulation 1829/2003 without however providing any kind of supporting arguments. Such arguments could have been, beyond the wording of Articles 20 (5) and 17 (5), the legislative purpose of Regulation 1829/2003, namely to replace the system provided by the Directive where the applicant so wishes.
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Another systematic argument could have been the combined reading of Articles 20 (5) and 17 (5) of the Regulation with Article 12 of the Directive, which would support the wide interpretation of the term "authorised" chosen by the AG. Overall, while a different interpretation of the legal provisions in question (especially Article 12 of the Directive) would have been possible in the present case, from the purely legal-technical point of view the Court's conclusion regarding the legal basis was defensible.
Implications for EU multi-level governance of GMOs
Beyond legal technicalities this judgment could have significant legal-political and practical consequences 32 for EU multi-level governance of GMOs. Behind the narrowly defined legal problem of the right legal basis lies the more general problem of the overlap and potential tension between the scope of application between the two legal regimes of Directive 2001/18 and Regulation 1829/2003. The AG's view of the equivalence of both these regimes with regard to the level of requirement for the adoption of "emergency measures" does not convince.
33 It understates the differences in the way the Directive and the Regulation respectively constitute the distribution of regulatory authority between the EU and the national level.
While Article 23 of the Directive allows the Member States to take "safeguard measures" under certain circumstances directly and at their own discretion, Article 34 of the Regulation speaks of "emergency measures," and grants the right of adopting such measures solely and primarily to the Commission. The Member States only retain a residual right in case of Commission's inaction. Therefore, Article 34 of the Regulation arguably constitutes a change of paradigms from a de-centralised approach to national derogations, 34 where decisional discretion to act is granted to national authorities, to a centralised approach where the Commission acts as a kind of "super" risk manager for the entire Union. This may be seen as problematic, if one considers that GMO cultivation raises issues of environmental impact, agricultural land use, and co-existence between GM and other agricultural products. These aspects of GMO cultivation originally motivated the adoption of the de-centralised approach to post-approval risk management by the Member States. The latter are arguably better equipped to monitor, assess, and to react to risks potentially occurring on location in their territories, which is why the principle of subsidiarity supports the de-centralised approach to safeguard measures under Directive 2001/18.
It is worth noting that de-centralisation and flexibility within the EU legal regime for GMOs were among the reasons why some scholars have described this regime as exemplifying features of new, experimentalist or multi-level governance.
35 Further features of the de-centralised approach under the Directive can be seen in Article 26a, which leaves the management of co-existence in the hands of the Member States thus taking it out of the scope of EU harmonisation. Moreover, a recent legislative proposal by the Commission aims at granting the Member States the right to restrict the cultivation of GMOs on national territory on so-called socioeconomic grounds.
36 This shows that there are significant differences in the governance approaches to post-market management of GMOs between the legal regime of Directive 2001/18 and that of Regulation 1829/2003.
It could be argued that the de-centralised approach to GMO cultivation for now remains valid for GMOs authorised under the Directive. However, it is likely that the relevance of the Directive in future regulation of GM seeds will decrease beyond the case of "existing products." The Court's ruling can be seen as strengthening the right of GMO producers to choose the applicable legal regime thus replacing the Directive's framework with that of Regulation 1829/2003. The latter also covers cultivation of GM seed while offering applicants the advantage of filing only one application for authorisation that would cover both the cultivation and the subsequent marketing of a GMO as food or feed. Article 34 of the Regulation offers the applicant an additional advantage, because it restricts the right of the Member States, many of which are opposed to GMO cultivation, to adopt restrictive measures in the first place, as has now been confirmed by the Court. It seems likely that companies will use the possibility of opting out, so-to-speak, from the legal regime of the Directive as far as GMOs with food and feed purposes are concerned. The present case illustrates that this is already happening. It seems, therefore, that the legal situation at present as confirmed by the Court effectively empowers the applicants by giving them the choice of avoiding the applicability of Directive 2001/18.
The present judgment does not consider these issues, nor does it engage with arguments speaking against the application of Regulation 1829/2003 to the cultivation of GMOs.
37 It confirms the trend towards a wider scope of application of the Regulation, and thus the trend towards more centralised governance of GMO releases in the EU. At the same time, the remaining scope of application for the Directive is arguably small (namely for GMO field trials and GMOs cultivated for other purposes than food and feed). This creates a legal situation where GMOs cultivated for food and feed purposes and those cultivated for other purposes are treated differently without apparent substantive justification. In the present judgment, however, the Court effectively departed from its previous case law. 39 It interpreted Article 34 of Regulation 1829/2003 as requiring for the adoption of emergency measures (at EU level, and in case of failure to act on the part of the Commission, at national level) the likelihood of a significant risk to human health and the environment, which is evidenced by new scientific data, and establishes a situation of urgency. In fact, when interpreting the level of requirement under Article 34 under the third question the Court did not invoke the precautionary principle at all.
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Thus, the Court did not take into account the findings of many years of research in the field of science and technology studies and risk governance, which indicate that modern technological risks defy traditional probability-based approaches to risk assessment. 41 In the context of technological risks the main problem encountered in risk assessment is seen to be not just the calculation of probability of the occurrence of known negative outcomes, but the determination of the potential hazards as such. Moreover, the adequacy of choosing as narrow a condition as likelihood of a serious risk proven by new scientific evidence can be doubted. Such condition is likely to never be fulfilled in the case of agricultural biotechnology that interacts within a complex environmental system, the consequences on which could only appear in the medium and long term. The definition of risk chosen by the Court in the present judgment is closer to that of danger. In the latter, the expected hazard is known and likely to realise at some point requiring urgent preventive measures. The notion of risk, on the contrary, is more complex, and involves problems of scientific knowledge, uncertainty, indeterminacy, and ambiguity.
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It should be noted that the narrow legislative wording of Article 34 has preconditioned to some extent the interpretation chosen by the Court. However, the AG's legal opinion shows that a less strict interpretation of Article 34 was possible.
43 The Court again chose to stick closely to the "black letter" of the legal text, and to interpret the conditions for the adoption of emergency measures in stricter terms than its AG. 42 Van Asselt and Renn, "Risk Governance", supra note 41; Brian Wynne, "Uncertainty and Environmental Learning", 2 Global Environmental Change (1992), pp. 111-127. 43 See AG's legal opinion, para. 71: "in order to adopt emergency measures relating to genetically modified organisms pursuant to Article 34 of the regulation, it is necessary for the existence of a risk to human health, animal health, or the environment to be established, which is not merely hypothetical, and for the probability of such harm occurring to be significant, even though it has not necessarily been determined precisely."
